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Three Measures of Political Alienation, 1952 to 1976

By Michael J. Muha

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Sociology Honors

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## INTRODUCTION

Political trust is basic to the stability and survival of our democracy. Without the trust of citizens, political leaders are without power. To operate, they must have the "loyal cooperation of members of the system without having to specify in advance what such cooperation will entail" (Gamson, 1968:43). The effectiveness of political leadership depends to some extent on this "blank check." Without it, authorities lose the capacity to "commit resources to attain collective goals" (Gamson, 1968:43). Trust therefore functions as a form of popular support for the political system. This trust assists members of society in tolerating policy outcomes to which they are opposed (Gamson, 1968:45; Easton, 1965:278) by submerging individual desires to the needs of the entire nation. Success in leadership requires trust; this is becoming even more important today, given the complexity of the problems leaders must deal with, and in a society where racial and ethnic minorities are demanding political equality (Aberbach and Walker, 1970:1199).

The very definition of democracy requires that the general public participate in political decision making. Consensus theory states that the "ideal Democratic

citizen...covets his right to place demands upon elites" though he often chooses not to exercise it, and when he does, does so only in "the prescribed manner and appropriate circumstances" (Wright,1976:51). The option of exercising influence checks elite power and perpetuates the Democratic "myth" (Wright,1976:51). The conviction that one is powerless to influence the government may lead to feelings that officials are breaching the political norms, that an element of illegitimacy has entered into the political system (Easton,1965:299). A sense of efficacy also promotes solidarity in society. Citizens perceive that the common will is obeyed by the political system. The government serves the purposes of the many, protecting their political rights so that they may proceed with the "pursuit of happiness." If the political order betrays the public and the public perceives that they are powerless, the common bond between people begins to disintegrate and the threat of mass society becomes real. And if the atomization of society does occur, its susceptibility to the influence of charismatic individuals or groups or to "irrational political outbursts" (Wright,1976:23) is considerably heightened.

The present study seeks to discover the relationships that exist among three operationalizations of political alienation, social location (demographic) characteristics of the individual, and dissatisfaction with government policy. After a theoretical discussion of anomie and alienation and their extensions to political alienation, measures of

political cynicism, internal political inefficacy, and external political inefficacy are examined with various measures of ascribed and achieved individual attributes and with the perception of policy differences with the Republican and Democratic Parties. Multivariate models are then used to examine the relative impact of these two set of variables on the measures of political alienation.

#### THEORIES OF ANOMIE AND ALIENATION

One path to an understanding of political alienation begins by an examination of Durkheim's concept of "anomie." Man, according to Durkheim, is not satisfied when he possesses only those material goods which ensure his survival. Man has unlimited desires for well-being, luxury, and pleasure. Being unlimited, they

constantly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched. Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture. It has been claimed, indeed, that human activity aspires beyond assignable limits and sets itself unattainable goals. But how can such an undetermined state any more be reconciled with the conditions of mental life than with the demands of physical life? All man's pleasure in acting, moving and exerting himself implies the sense that his efforts are not in vain and that by walking he has advanced" (Durkheim, 1966:247-248) [1].

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[1]Psychologists call this "hedonic relativism:"

Where pleasure is concerned, humans are insatiable animals, shifting their criteria level or adaption level upward when the level of pleasurable input increases, so that once again experience is scored as one-third pleasure, one-third pain, and one-third blah (Campbell, 1975:1121).

Man would always be unhappy were it not for some force limiting his passions. Only then can "they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied" (Durkheim, 1966:248). But no biological forces exist which can limit the passions; there must exist some force outside of man which dominates him. Society is this force. The individual is socialized to have certain expectations and to behave in certain ways. Under conditions of social stability, society controls and regulates the needs and desires of its citizens. The life experiences of the people conform to the expectations established by the normative order. When crisis occurs, the regulating norms begin to crumble and life experiences are no longer congruent with expectations derived from norms (Durkheim, 1966:252). Durkheim defines this phenomenon as "anomie."

Merton (1968) adapts some of Durkheim's concepts by introducing a model of deviant responses to anomie. When culturally prescribed goals are not congruent with the means for attaining them, anomie becomes prevalent. Merton argues that there is a strong emphasis on economic success as a main societal goal. Unfortunately, there is differential access to the means to reaching this success. Cultural bias, discrimination, lack of resources, prejudice, and other factors all serve to prevent some people from reaching success and slow the process toward success for others. This "extreme cultural emphasis on the goal of success attenuates conformity to institutionally prescribed methods of moving

toward this goal...norms are robbed of their powers to regulate behavior" (Merton, 1968:223). The anomic situation, therefore, "leads to low predicability in behavior, and ...may well lead to the belief in luck" (Seeman, 1959:787). Merton continues by deriving a topology based on this means-goals disjunction: conformers are those who accept both the means and goals of society; innovators reject the means but accept the goals; ritualists reject the goals but accept the means; retreatist reject both the goals and the means; and rebels reject both the goals and the means of society, but replace them with their own.

A second starting point toward the understanding of alienation stems from the work of Marx. Though he was mainly interested in the work situation, his ideas may be applied to political alienation (Yinger, 1973:177). Durkheim sees the division of labor as promoting solidarity and thus preventing anomie; Marx finds it the cause of alienation (Lukes, 1972:24).

In capitalistic society, the more the worker produces, the more surplus value the capitalist tends to realize; the worker does not receive wages equal to the labor put into the products sold. Rather, the capitalist gains at the expense of the worker. As his capital grows, the greater his domination over the worker (Arthur, 1970:16). The worker is merely a commodity, his life devalued while the value of his



products increases (Marx, 1964:121). Man is separated from his labor, his own products, from other men, and from his species. The product of labor is the "objectification" of labor, labor "embodied in an object" (Marx, 1844:108). But since he is not compensated in property equal to the amount of labor he expends, it follows that the more he expends himself, the more of himself he leaves in the object. Man becomes poorer in his "inner life" and belongs less to himself. His life no longer belongs to him but to the object he produces (Marx, 1964:122):

The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien.

Man is lowered to an animal state (Marx, 1844:111), alienated (estranged) from everything and everybody. He is not involved in the decision of what to produce or how to produce it and competition and class hostility make cooperation with other men difficult if not impossible (Ohlman, 1971:133-134). Life becomes meaningless and the worker is powerless to change his condition (Lukes, 1972:28).

Fromm (1955) holds a position on alienation consistent with Marx. For Fromm, alienation is self-estrangement; man

does not experience himself as the center of his world, as the creator of his own acts--but his acts and their consequences have become his masters, whom he obeys, or whom he may even worship (Fromm, 1955:120).

Man does not actively determine his life consequences. Rather he is dependent on power outside himself, "unto whom he has projected his living substance" (Fromm, 1955:124). Modern society alienates man from the work he does, from pleasurable activities, and from the social forces which determine society and the people in it (1955:137). Man and society become "atoms,...little particles estranged from each other but held together by selfish interests and by the necessity to make use of each other" (1955:139-140).

#### Conceptual Problems

There has been a major conceptual problem in the study of alienation. Alienation, a phenomenon of the individual, is often confused with anomie, anomia, or anomy, terms which properly refer to a societal condition only[2]. Empirical research, until very recently, has not always served to clear this confusion. Srole (1956) and others have attempted to apply Merton's model in empirical research using social-psychological measures of anomie[3]. But the word

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[2]See Yinger (1973) for discussion. Several studies have confused the anomie-alienation terminology, including McClosky and Schaar (1965a, 1965b) and Srole (1956).

[3]Srole's (1956) Anomia Scale and its variations are often used to measure alienation (or anomia, as the scale states). Schwartz (1973:7) argues that the scale measures a complex of isolation, despair, and powerlessness--individual rather than societal attributes. Certain methodological problems are also associated with the scale: it seems to measure two polar types, "anomia" and "eunomic" rather than the continuum as users of the scale imply (Miller and Butler, 1966).

anomie is used to describe both a state of society and an individual state, extending the confusion of terminology and of conceptualization. Most research has used the social-psychological conceptualization, the individual being the focus of analysis. Terminology has not advanced with the increasing complexity of analysis, however, and several new problems have arisen. First, we find confusion over what the individual is alienated from: society, people, institutions, himself? Second, this has led to difficulties and inconsistencies in the operationalization of alienation. Seeman (1959) began to clear some of the confusion by reviewing the literature and defining the five most prevalent conceptions of alienation. Powerlessness is conceived as "the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, he seeks" (1959,784). Meaninglessness is where the individual is characterized by having a "low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about the future outcomes of behavior can be made." (1959:786).. When there is a "high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve given goals," the individual is experiencing normlessness. The fourth type of alienation is isolation, where a low reward value is assigned to "goals and beliefs that are typically highly valued in the given society" (1959:789). Finally, we have self-estrangement, where alienation is the "degree of dependence of the given behavior upon anticipated future

rewards" (1959:790). It refers to the "inability of the individual to find self-rewarding...activities that engage him" (1959:790). Much of the past research has assumed that when one kind of alienation is measured, the findings can be generalized to other forms of alienation[4]. Such generalizations are problematic, however. What is required is a "context-specific" approach (Martin et al., 1974) where both different dimensions of alienation and their different social contexts are analyzed. Dean (1961), Finifter (1970), Neal and Rettig (1963, 1967), and Simmons (1966) have all found that operationalizations of different aspects of alienation are not perfectly correlated.

#### POLITICAL ALIENATION

Political cynicism and political inefficacy have dominated the empirical literature on political alienation[5]. It is from the concept of normlessness that political trust is derived. Normlessness in the political sense refers traditionally to distrust of the political system. Normlessness is "perceived" not by the individual feeling anomic, but by the individual seeing frequent deviation by the government from political norms

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[4]For instance, see footnote [3] about Srole's Anomie Scale and its failure to differentiate between several dimensions of alienation.

[5]Political self estrangement runs a fairly close third; see Schacht (1970) and Schwartz (1973). One reason for the domination by trust and efficacy is the availability of the SRC/CPS American National Election Studies, whose high quality data includes questions tapping these two forms of political alienation.

(Finifter, 1970:396). Political trust is thus "the belief that the government is operating according to one's normative expectations of how government should function" (Miller, 1974b:989).

The concept of political inefficacy has two dimensions. The first is internal political inefficacy and is directly derivable from Seeman's definition of powerlessness. The politically inefficacious individual feels he cannot influence the actions of the government, that he has low "personal feelings of political competence" (Converse, 1972:334). Political decisions are made independent of any actions the individual may take (Easton and Dennis 1967:26; Finifter, 1970:390). External political inefficacy is the second form and refers to "trust in system responsiveness" (Converse, 1972:334). Government officials care little about how a citizen feels; rather they are only interested in being in power:

As a norm it refers to the timeless theme of democratic theory that members of a democratic regime ought to regard those who occupy positions of political authority as responsive agents and that the members themselves ought to be disposed to participate in the honors and offices of the system (Easton and Dennis, 1967:26).

These two dimensions are analogous to the distinction drawn in the attitude theory literature between the cognitive and evaluative (affective) components of attitudes:

The former is a probability dimension and refers to beliefs about the probability of unprobability that a particular object or relationship exists. The

latter is an evaluation of the object or relationship--whether it is good or bad, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, or the like (Aberbach, 1977:1545).

The internally inefficacious says, "I cannot influence the government." The externally inefficacious says, "The government fails to listen to me." This distinction has rarely been made in the literature, but may be important for understanding political alienation[6]. Schwartz (1973:13) suggests that many Americans are oriented more toward the political system than toward their personal participation, a hypothesis that can only be tested by making the distinction between internal and external inefficacy. More recently, Aberbach (1977) found that blacks were more likely to blame personal failure or inadequacies as sources of power dissatisfaction than whites, while whites were more willing to blame the unresponsiveness of government institutions. A somewhat fine distinction must be made between cynicism and the two efficacies. Political cynicism occurs when a person sees the government not following political norms; the government cannot be trusted to do right, it abuses its powers. This perhaps can be called a structural characteristic. External political inefficacy is more procedural; there is too much red-tape, preventing the individual from influencing the government. Both cynicism and external inefficacy use the government or political

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[6]Easton and Dennis (1967) also identify a third form of efficacy: conduct. The efficacious person is one who actually can influence his political destiny.

system as a reference point; internal political inefficacy does not[7].

The possible causes of political alienation are many, but arrange themselves in three main categories: social location variables, psychological factors, and policy dissatisfaction. Persons of low social status--the young or very old, the poor, minorities, women, the uneducated--all have received a fair amount of attention in the literature. These factors follow from Merton's notion of the disjunctive relationship between goals and means. Because of discrimination, lack of resources, lack of experience in the political system, and the inability to comprehend the intricacies of social, political, and economic interrelationships (because of low degrees of education), individuals are not able to integrate into the social system completely enough to achieve the goals society emphasises. The means to those goals are just not available through normal channels. The sense of political powerlessness increases directly because of this. Political cynicism may or may not increase, however, since inefficacy could be related to a lack of interest in and a neutral attitude

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[7]It is rather simplistic to separate the concept of alienation into seemingly distinct dimensions. Each dimension is related to the others, theoretically and quantitatively. For instance, there are norms governing the process by which demands are introduced into the political system. A sense of powerlessness may be personal, or may refer to the perception of normlessness (Easton, 1965:200). Inefficacy may even lead to distrust of the government, at least in specified situations.

toward the political system. Or, while a person may feel personally inefficacious, he may believe that one or more of his reference groups will "attain his values for him" (Schwartz, 1973:13)[8].

McCloskey and Schaar (1965a) study the the psychological dimensions of alienation (what they call "anomy") and find that cognitive and personality factors such as hostility, anxiety, inflexible defensiveness, and intolerance of others are related to increased alienation. Rosenberg (1956) found that a low faith in people was related to a lack of trust in political representatives. Little work has been done which directly relates political measures of alienation with totally psychological variables, however.

Recently, a new emphasis has been put on political factors as determinants of attitudes toward the political system, including efficacy and trust in the government[9]. Gamson (1968:178) states the trust in government is affected by the nature of the political decisions made and satisfaction or dissatisfaction with them. Miller (1974a, 1974b), Citrin (1974), and House and Mason (1975) all found that persons with high political cynicism are also inclined to be dissatisfied with government policy or to feel

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[8] Though this seems unlikely, given that people of lower socioeconomic backgrounds tend not to belong to voluntary associations or to be very active in political organizations and parties. See Verba and Nie (1972: Chapter 11).

[9] See Citrin (1974); Easton (1965); Gamson (1968); House and Mason (1975); Miller (1974a, 1974b); and Schwartz (1973).



that the positions held by the major political parties tend to be distant from their own positions.

Several studies have used composite measures of political alienation, combining two or more of the dimensions defined by Seeman (1959). As with the study of alienation, such composite measures are to be avoided at all costs. Aberbach (1969:89) provides a eloquent summary of the reasons:

...using an ad hoc composite to measure political alienation is self-defeating and leaves unanswered a series of nagging questions. Just how are the indicators related? Which part of the composite index is causing the relationship described or, better, how does each indicator relate to the various dependent variables? Perhaps they operate in the same way, maybe only one plays a significant role, or perhaps there are interesting interactions between the indicators which are significant theoretically and empirically.

A major fault in the literature on political alienation has been the lack of a long term trend study. Have the factors affecting political alienation changed over time? Are social background factors consistently related in direction and strength with political alienation over a period of years? Do attitudes related to political alienation change, from weakly related in time  $t=1$  to strongly related in time  $t=1+n$ , or vice versa? Are the causes or correlates of different dimensions of political alienation the same or different? A second set of problems concerns sample and methodological problems. Much of the

past research has used small local samples, noncomparable measures, and little multivariate analysis. Consequently, the results of many studies are not generalizable or contradict the findings of others (see Wright, 1976: Chapter 3). The present study's use of high quality national survey data and fairly sophisticated methodology, along with a trend orientation, attempts to overcome some of these deficiencies.

## THE DATA, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS

The Survey Research Center/Center for Political studies American National Election Studies for the years 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, and 1976 are be used to assess the changing effects of social status and policy dissatisfaction variables on trust in government and internal and external political efficacy[10].

Three scales were created to measure political alienation: Trust in Government, Internal Political Efficacy, and External Political Efficacy scales. The full set of questions for each scale were asked only in certain years. The trust scale was created for 1958, 1964, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, and 1976. The internal political efficacy scale was created for the ten years of 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, and 1976. The complete set of questions for the external political efficacy scale were not asked until 1968; only the years 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, and 1976 are included.

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[10]The data utilized in this paper were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.

The Trust in Government scale was created from the following questions (cynical responses indicated by an asterik):

Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes\*, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time\*?[ 11]

Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves\* or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

Do you think that almost all of the people running the government are smart people, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing\*?

Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked\*, not very many are, or do you think that hardly any of them are crooked?

The scale was created by counting the number of cynical responses over the five questions. Respondents with more than two items of missing data were eliminated from the analysis[12]. The scale ranges from zero (low cynicism) to

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[11]A fourth category response is also used: "None of the time." This was never offered as a choice but was volunteered by respondents. For purposes of analysis, this response was combined with the "Some of the time" responses.  
[12]Very few respondents were eliminated because of missing data. Some variables with highly skewed distributions (e.g., race) required that as many cases be available as possible. The overall tendency of inclusion of some missing data is a slight conservative bias since scores of any respondents having missing data could never reach the maximum possible alienation score. Missing data in the following two scales can similarly be evaluated.

five (high cynicism). Guttman scale analysis is presented in Table 1. As can be seen, the five variables rarely formed an acceptable Guttman scale, defined as having a coefficient of reproducibility of at least .90 and a coefficient of scalability of .60 or better. This is at variance with other research using the same data. Miller (1974a) reports reproducibility coefficients greater than .90 for 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970. He took a more liberal approach in constructing his scales, however. Not only did he eliminate respondents with more than two items of missing data, but he also eliminated all who had more than two errors in the Guttman scale, thus guaranteeing a higher than normal reproducibility coefficient. His results, therefore are perhaps a little less generalizable.

The internal political inefficacy scale was created by counting the number of "Agree" (alienated) responses to the following three questions:

People like me don't have any say about what the government does.

Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

One item of missing data was allowed per respondent. The scale ranges from zero (high efficacy) to three (low

efficacy--high inefficacy). Guttman scale scores are presented in Table 1.

Finally, the external political inefficacy scale was constructed by counting the number of "Agree" responses to the following three questions:

I don't think public officials care much about what people like me think.

Generally speaking, those we elect to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly.

Parties are only interested in people's votes but not in their opinions.

Again, one item of missing data was allowed, and the scale runs from zero (high efficacy) to three (low efficacy--high inefficacy). Table 1 presents Guttman scale scores for each year.

The efficacy scales share a common problem: both are susceptible to acquiescence. In any population, some proportion is going to agree with an item regardless of its content. Acquiescence is less of a problem when half of the items are reversed, since this causes acquiescers to be assigned to the midpoint of the scale where there is a minimum of influence on statistical analysis (Wright, 1976:95). Wright (1976) studied acquiescent responses to the internal inefficacy items and the external "don't think public officials care" question in the 1968 SRC election study. He concludes that acquiescence can safely be ignored,

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although he uses no fixed criteria by which his results can be compared (Wright, 1976:100)[13].

#### TRENDS IN CYNICISM AND INEFFICACY

It has already been shown in much past research that political cynicism has risen in the past twenty years. This may have to do with the increasing issue constraint characterizing the public. Citizens are no longer the passive uninformed individuals Campbell et al. (1960) found in the late fifties. Rather, issues have been much more salient, especially with the advent of the Vietnam war, the civil rights movement, recession, and urban blight, among others (see Miller and Levitin, 1976), and the more politically involved have more coherent political views (Nie et al., 1976:283). People are more interested in examining the issues. Since more is known about each issue, more can be found to disagree with, increasing dissatisfaction and cynicism.

Trends in internal inefficacy are much more difficult to determine theoretically. It has probably remained fairly constant over the years, although with the black

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[13]Wright (1976:110) presents evidence that the reliability, homogeneity, and internal consistency of the trust and efficacy scales are average or slightly better than average for scales of the same type. He also concludes that each scale is sufficiently valid and that they are distinctly different from analogous personality measures. He uses data from the SRC 1966 and 1968 election studies only, however. See Robinson et al. (1968) and Robinson and Shaver (1969) for discussion of alternative measures of political alienation.

consciousness movement and the increasing politicization of women recently we may find an overall increase in personal efficacy. External inefficacy should vary with the historical context; Government responsiveness should be perceived as higher during election years than during off years. Candidates are more willing to shape policy to suit their constituents when they face re-election than when their incumbancy is temporarily assured. Voting requires the least amount of effort on the part of the individual but creates tangible returns almost immediately: someone is elected. This reaffirms the individual's perception of his constitutional right to participate in government.

The mean levels of the three political alienation scales by year are presented in Table 2. Political cynicism shows a monotonic increase between 1964 and 1976, and has leveled somewhat between 1974 and 1976 after a big jump between 1972 and 1974. This large increase after 1972 is probably due to Watergate and the resignation of the two top public executives in the United States. Government misconduct was no longer abstract; here was tangible evidence that things were not right.

Internal inefficacy shows no consistent trend. There perhaps is a slight tendency for middle or low range efficacy scores to occur during election years, but any conclusion would be equivocal. External inefficacy, however, was consistently lower during election years than off-election



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years. As was expected, people feel the government is more responsive during election years, when candidates must cater to public opinion.

POLITICAL ALIENATION AND SOCIAL LOCATION  
Hypothesized Effects of Race, Sex, Education,  
Income, And Social class

This section discusses some of the reasons social location variables such as sex, education, income, social class, and race should be related to political alienation. It should be stressed that the different dimensions of political alienation (cynicism, internal inefficacy, and external inefficacy) may not be related to the same variables in the same way. Some specification should be expected to occur.

Persons who occupy lower status positions in society are often "denied access to full participation in social life" (Olsen, 1969:295). Women, blacks, the poor, and the uneducated are disadvantaged in social, economic, and political opportunities. Sex should not be related to cynicism or external inefficacy. Men and women generally experience the same socialization processes leading to support of the government and the learning of political norms. Other socialization processes do create sex role differences, however. Women have traditionally held a submissive political role in a society dominated by men. They have not been adequately socialized with a sense of

personal political competence (Campbell et al., 1960:490). Males have the political experience. Women, until very recently, have never been involved in formal mainline politics in large numbers. Only now are they even beginning to have a major impact on the creation of government policy or its administration. Thus internal political inefficacy may very well be associated with sex. Women should have a heightened sense of personal political inadequacy; they should have a higher level of internal inefficacy than males.

House and Mason (1975:132) document the educational upgrading of education in the United States "exerting downward pressure on alienation in the 1960s," though historical events counteracted the pressure to make alienation increase. A manifest (and latent) function of the educational system in the United States (and in all other countries as well) has been to instill social and political norms into children. Easton and Dennis (1967) argue that acquisition of these norms at an early and impressionable age may offset any adult tendency to feel inefficacious[14].

Increasing education increases cognitive ability. Persons with low levels of education find it difficult to "organize and understand the events and ideas they encounter" because their minds lack "power and efficiency" (McClosky and

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[14] Once a man enters the work force, however, job experience may become more important in determining a person's social and political attitudes than early socialization experiences (Abramson and Brooks, 1971). Type of occupation "largely determines [a person's] peers, his authority relationships, his security, and his income" (1971:404).

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Schaar, 1965a:21). This "difficulty apparently produces, not security and confidence, but bewilderment and anxiety." People who cannot organize social and political information tend to be confused about society's values and norms and thus tend to see society as lacking in order and meaning (McCloskey and Schaar, 1965a:21). This in turn leads to powerlessness and distrust of the political system.

Income brings with it increased resources to influence the government. Money is power. Persons with higher incomes do not have to wonder where their next meal is going to come from, nor do they need to worry about unemployment compensation and welfare aid (except from the standpoint of how much tax money it is costing them). Welfare is a much more salient issue to the poor than to the wealthy; government red tape is bound to cause dissatisfaction. Perhaps more important is a sense of relative deprivation. The poor see themselves getting poorer as the rich get richer, and blame the government for the unequal distribution of wealth in the United States. We would thus expect higher political cynicism levels for lower income persons.

Because poorer people have less resource, they are actually less able to influence the government. This in turn should lead to their having lower levels of internal efficacy. Similarly, since the government can be seen as unresponsive to their needs, the less wealthy should also have a higher level of external inefficacy than the wealthy.

Subjective social class is a composite measure of

income, education, and occupation. Its importance is that it measures a relative sense of well being. Lower SES persons may tend to see the world as a threatening place and be predisposed toward certain stands on social and political issues (Horton and Thompson, 1962). People may feel they belong in a higher or lower social class than they actually do, influencing their level of political alienation. Middle class persons should be less cynical and more efficacious than working class people. Higher class people have more access to the government, especially since government officials tend to come from the middle and upper classes rather than the lower ones. These officials are more in tune with the needs and desires of the upper classes; their needs and desires are congruent. Middle and upper class persons have more incomes and education generally. They have more resources to influence the government and a greater amount of knowledge to implement those resources to satisfy their demands.

Race should be related to all three dimensions of political alienation. It has been documented that blacks were less cynical than whites before the late sixties but became more cynical in the early seventies. The government has symbolized black interests in the past:

It won him freedom, gave him the best treatment he received in his worst days in the South, provided a measure of relief in the Depression and the difficult periods that followed, and has done the most to secure his rights and protect him during the contemporary struggle for equality (Aberbach and Walker, 1973:125).

But rising expectations caused by rising levels of education

and by actual political gains by blacks (see Wilson, 1978) have led to increasing feelings of relative deprivation (Aberbach and Walker, 1973). Distrust in the government became a way of "rejecting the traditional sense of dependency" on white friends and allies (Aberbach and Walker, 1973:126). Two factors, the great increases in income and education, may add or subtract from the effect of cynicism. First, education may have made blacks more aware of their plight or more empathetic toward black political and social groups and thus more cynical in the seventies (Aberbach and Walker, 1973: 196-197). But, rising income may have placated many blacks. As they enter into the middle class they are likely to desire security for their new-found wealth[15]. The result may be an economically conservative black middle class, a group more receptive and supportive of conservative government policy.

Blacks have had little personal political power and little ability to influence the government (see Middleton, 1963). Historically, the government has not been overly receptive to black influence, except in cases where their vote was necessary to win an election. The government has not been responsive to black needs on a large scale, at least until recently. We would expect blacks to have a lower sense of internal and external political efficacy than whites. Personal power may have risen for blacks since the

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[15]Wattenberg (1974) takes this position. For the first time in history, the majority of blacks are now in the middle class and many are not eager to participate in activities which may threaten their status.

late sixties, if the rise in black activism can be used as a rough measure. Trends in external inefficacy are more indefinite; whether it has risen or not depends on whether blacks have seen the government responding to their increased activism. Both efficacies may be in part explained by the differential educational levels of blacks and whites. Blacks as a group have a lower educational level than whites. Consequently, since people with more education are more efficacious, the difference between blacks and whites may be due to differences in education only.

#### Results: Social Location and Political Alienation

Sex and its relationship to political alienation is examined first. There have been no consistent differences between males and females in their level on cynicism and external inefficacy (Figures 1 and 2)[16]. Eta is never higher than .08 and usually much lower. In Figure 3, however, a difference does occur. Females are consistently more likely to feel internally inefficacious than males, with the association varying in strength from .075 to .144.

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[16]Graphs are presented instead of tables because they are much easier for the reader to interpret. The actual data, including Ns are reported in the Appendix.

Eta is used throughout the present study because it does not make assumptions about linear relationships between variables and because it can be used with nominal, ordinal, and interval level independent variables. It does require interval level dependent variables, an assumption fulfilled by the three political alienation scales. Where the association is overly large because of extreme curvilinearity, Pearson's  $r$  is also presented; Eta and  $r$  are directly comparable (Loether and McTavish, 1974:251). Eta varies from 0 to +1 and does not show direction.

Females are more likely to blame their lack of political efficacy on their personal inadequacies than men, probably because of the "lower class" status into which they have been socialized.

Race presents some interesting contrasts. Before 1970, blacks were less cynical than whites (Figure 4). In 1970, blacks experienced a great increase in cynicism, rising above the cynicism level of whites (who also experienced a somewhat less sharp increase in cynicism). Between 1968 and 1970, major events took place which may be responsible for this reversal of trust in the government. The Civil Rights Acts in the sixties greatly roused hopes in blacks of a more racially egalitarian society. These hopes brought with them increased demands on the government. But the government was not responsive enough to satisfy minorities. Many of the racial riots in the late sixties were caused or nourished by the frustration blacks were feeling. Between 1974 and 1976, cynicism seems to have leveled somewhat, with a fairly consistent difference between whites and blacks ( $\text{Eta} = .071$  and  $.076$  in 1974 and 1976, respectively).

Though the relationship between cynicism and race changes in direction, the relationship between internal and external inefficacy and race remains consistent over the years, at least until 1976 (Figures 5 and 6). Blacks have always felt more personally ineffective and also evaluate the

political system as unresponsive to their influence. In 1976, however, these differences seem to wash out; there is almost no difference between the two races. 1976 saw a more peaceful political atmosphere with the election of Democrat Jimmy Carter to the presidency. Since the vast majority of blacks are Democrats and because Carter appealed to minority groups, blacks may have felt that the government would be more receptive to their influence.

Before 1970, education was slightly related to cynicism, with the higher educated persons tending to be more trustful (Figure 7). The major exception was college graduates, who tended to be a little more cynical than lower educate persons. By 1970 the relationship stabilizes: all educational groups becoming more cynical, with the more highly educated being the most trustful. Eta is never higher than a moderate .166, however.

Education has been highly related to the two efficacy measures, however (Figure 8 and 9). As Campbell et al. (1960) first found and later emirical literature consistently supported, the higher the level of education, the higher the feeling of powerfulness, although the difference between persons with an eighth grade education or less and persons with some high school background tends to merge in 1976. Education is a far better predictor of efficacy than of trust.

Certain problems were encountered with the measurement



of income. The SRC/CPS election studies used seven different coding systems between 1952 and 1976 to measure income. Secondly, the value of the dollar has changed radically since 1952. A dollar in 1979[17] was worth \$2.57 in 1952. An attempt was made to transform the different coding forms into standard 1979 dollars but the resulting income intervals were too ungainly and crude to use as valid indicators of income, even if recoded. Therefore, respondents were divided into quintiles, giving a rough income comparability over the years studied[18].

Income is a somewhat inconsistent predictor of political cynicism (Figure 10). There is a tendency for cynicism to rise as income drops; the relationship is not very strong, however. Only in 1974 is the relationship completely monotonic.

Income is a fairly strong predictor of both internal and external inefficacy (Figures 11 and 12). Eta is never lower than .24 until 1976 for internal inefficacy and usually much higher. The inverse relationship between internal inefficacy and income is monotonic for all years except 1966. In 1976

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[17]The January, 1979 consumer price index value of .489 was used to adjust income into 1979 dollars (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1978:482; U.S. Bureau of Census, 1979:482).

[18]There is at least one major problem with this method. Actual gains have been made in income due to the rising standard of living in the United States, even after standardizing income. Income as measured here does not take this change into account.

it does lose some of its predictive value; all persons seem to become more efficacious, with a greater increase in efficacy for those in the lower income brackets. External inefficacy exhibits the same overall relationship. The fourth highest income group does seem to be more inefficacious than the middle income group, but this difference is very slight and does not detract significantly from the overall relationship.

The working class are consistently more likely to be personally powerless (Figure 13) and to blame the political system for their powerlessness (Figure 14) than the middle class. Except for 1964, they are also more likely to be cynical toward the government, though the relationships are not as strong as they are for the efficacy measures (Figure 15).

#### A Summary on the Effects of Social Location

In summary, the data show that social location variables to some extent determine levels of political alienation, but that the level at which predictive power is found is dependent on how political alienation is measured. Cynicism, internal inefficacy, and external inefficacy were all related to education. Its predictive power was much higher for the efficacy measures, however. Likewise, income was a much better predictor of the efficacies than it was of cynicism. Race did have some predictive value, though at a lower level

than one might have expected. Race had a consistent relationship with the two efficacy measures over the years; blacks were always less efficacious. The cynicism-race relationship is historically bound, however. The reversal from higher white cynicism to higher black cynicism is dependent on the historical context. Sex was found to be unrelated to cynicism and external inefficacy, but associated with internal inefficacy; females were personally more powerless than males. And finally, social class was consistent over the years in predicting each of the measures of political alienation.

A couple points should be noted. As House and Mason show, cynicism seems to vary equally across measures of social location over time, the exception being race. This may indicate that rising levels of cynicism may be better explained by some other set of variables. The next section provides evidence that policy dissatisfaction does explain some of this variation.

Political efficacy, however, has remained at a relatively constant level over the years. Its relationship to policy dissatisfaction will also be explored to determine if policy dissatisfaction can provide a fuller explanation of inefficacy.

#### POLITICAL ALIENATION AND POLICY DISSATISFACTION

Trust in the political system begins to decline when the

general citizenry sees a growing set of related and undesirable policy outcomes. Mistrust of authorities may be the first step toward mistrust of the political system. As the number of actual or perceived negative outcomes increases, the view that all authority is biased against the public may emerge[19]. With eroding support, first

demands could not be processed into outputs...Second, without support it would be impossible to assume some kind of stability in the rules and structure through the use of which demands are converted into outputs...And third, support is vital in order to maintain minimal cohesion within...[the] political community (Easton, 1965: 157).

An increase in "negative voting" may occur, where people vote not for a particular candidate or issue, but against the lesser of two evils (Aberbach, 1969: 99[20]. This may slowly lead to the conclusion that even the political and social institutions are a source of bias. Dissatisfaction may reach such a level that the political community may desire separation from the political institutions with which it is unhappy (Gamson, 1968: 51-52) [21].

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[19]And distrust is likely to create more distrust because of numerous feedback loops which generate trust and distrust (Aberbach and Walker, 1970: 1202). Once a person begins to see the world in a certain perspective (i.e., with mistrust), he places himself in a "new political and personal communication structure which may reinforce his alienation" (Schwartz, 1973: 161).

[20]Also see Levin (1960); Levin and Eden (1962: 55); McDill and Ridley (1962: 207); and Templeton (1966).

[21]For instance, alienation has been found to be significantly associated with mass movements and revolutionary activity (Kornhauser, 1963) and with campus protest activities (Clark and Egan, 1972).

In the 1970, 1972, 1974, and 1976 SRC/CPS election surveys, respondents were asked to place themselves and the two major political parties on several seven-point issue continuums. A measure of policy dissatisfaction for each respondent was created by computing the the absolute difference between the respondent's position on each issue scale and the scale position associated with each of the parties. A value of zero indicates no difference between the respondent's position and the position represented by the party. A maximum policy dissatisfaction score of six indicates the respondent has placed the party at one extreme of the scale and himself at the other.

An average measure of policy dissatisfaction was created by summing the distance scores over all variables for each year and dividing by the number of questions (fractions were rounded). This average measure is more parsimonious than using each individual question and may capture cumulative effects of dissatisfaction across the several issues (See Miller, 1974a:965). A disadvantage of this measure is that it does not allow us to evaluate the relative strengths of the issue questions[22].

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[22] Miller (1974a:965) also claims that the average measure correlates at a somewhat lower value, at least with measures of political cynicism, than do the individual issue questions. This conservative bias is not necessarily bad, however.

### Political Cynicism and Policy Dissatisfaction

Mean cynicism values by average distance from the Republican Party are presented in Table 3a for the total cross-section, white Democrats, black Democrats, Republicans, and Independents[23]. The cross-section, white Democrats, and black Democrats all experience a monotonic increase in cynicism as the average distance from Republican policy increases. The 3.9 percent who were least distant had a mean cynicism of only 1.77, while those who were most distant had a value of 4.21. For white Democrats, the cynicism level changed from 1.09 to 3.42 as one moves from least to most distant. Cynicism for black Democrats increased from 1.33 to 4.00.

Republicans and independents show almost monotonic relationships except for those persons least distant from the preceived Republican policy position. This may be due to the low number of people in the category, or may indicate a slight dissatisfaction with the number of policies being carried out by the government. Citizens who find their position on issue questions congruent with those of one of the major parties may be more aware that problems prevent those policies from being implemented (e.g., President Nixon unable to pass legislation through a Congress controlled by the opposing Democratic Party). The Republicans and

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[23]Republicans were not divided by race because so few blacks are Republican. Independents include those who lean toward the Democratic or Republican Parties.

independents generally show an increase in political cynicism with increasing distance from the perceived Republican Party position, however. The most alienated persons seem to be the black Democrats, white Democrats, and independents (group means of 2.51, 2.47, and 2.45, respectively). Republicans are the least alienated. All of the relationships are fairly strong ( $\eta^2 = .29$  or more) except for the Republicans ( $\eta^2 = .15$ ).

The same relationships occur when one looks at the mean cynicism levels by average distance from the Democratic Party (Table 3b). Political cynicism increases monotonically for the total cross-section (from 2.11 to 3.15), for white Democrats (from 2.15 to 3.71), and for black Democrats (from 2.01 to 3.09). The relationships for Republicans and independents are again slightly curvilinear. Republicans least distant from the Democratic position had a mean score of 2.00. Those next least cynical had a mean score .28 lower in value. After that, as distance increases, so does cynicism. Black and white Democrats and independents were again the most cynical (group means of 2.51, 2.47, and 2.47, respectively). The  $\eta^2$  values were much lower, however. The relationship is stronger for distance from the Republican Party than for distance from the Democratic Party, except in the case of Republicans.

In 1976, the relationships between policy

dissatisfaction and cynicism had changed somewhat, but the overall relationship of increasing political cynicism with increasing policy distance still held. This time, it was the total cross-section, the Republicans, and the independents who showed monotonic increases in cynicism as distance from the Republican Party increased (Table 4a). White and black Democrats show a slightly curvilinear relationship. For white Democrats, the difference between those least distant and those next least distant is so small (.01) that their curvilinearity can be ignored. Those most distant from Republican policy for black Democrats were slightly less cynical than those next most distance. This may be due to the small number of Black Democrats having a large policy difference. As in 1970, Republicans as a whole were less cynical (group mean is 2.56) than the two Democratic groups and the independents. One should notice, however, the increase in cynicism for each group between 1970 and 1976. The mean cynicism level for the total cross-section rose .59; for White Democrats, it increased by .63; for black Democrats, by .61; and by .44 and .69 for Republicans and independents. These findings uphold the earlier work of Miller (1974a; 1974b) and House and Mason (1975) who found that the "growing discrepancies between the attitudes of the electorate and the trend of political policies and events" have led to escalated political cynicism levels (House and Mason, 1975:143-144). The rise in cynicism has paralleled the rise in policy dissatisfaction. In most cases, the



relationship weakened slightly (e.g., Eta decreased from .36 to .27 for white Democrats). Eta did increase by .03 (from .15 to .18) for Republicans, too small to conclude that a major change took place.

Monotonic relationships are also evident when comparing mean cynicism with distance from the Democratic Party (Table 4b). The total cross-section means increase from 2.77 (least distant) to 3.63 (most distant). The increase is from 2.19 to 3.52 for Republicans and 2.59 to 4.13 for independents. The relationships are slightly curvilinear at the upper ends of the distance scale for the two Democratic groups. After mean cynicism rises to 3.35 from 2.19 (least distant), it drops to 3.10 (most distant). The same occurs for black Democrats: a rise from 2.89 to 3.37, then a drop to 3.00. Again, this could be due to the small sample size.

Consistent across all tables, 1970 and 1976, is the higher level of Republican trust overall, though cynicism increased for each group. Eta values decreased between the two years but generally remained stronger for dissatisfaction with Republican policy than with Democratic policy, suggesting a partisan determinant of cynicism.

Data presenting the relationship between dissatisfaction with both parties and political cynicism are presented for 1970 and 1976 in Tables 5a and 5b. Categories 4 thru 6 were collapsed from the original variables to increase the number of cases in each cell enough to make

analysis possible. Data entries in each cell are mean political cynicism values. As one can see, as policy dissatisfaction with both parties increases, cynicism also increases. As one moves from cell 0,0 (the top left-hand corner) down the diagonal to cell 4,4 (bottom right hand corner), the mean cynicism values increase monotonically. The marginals also show the same monotonic increase. Column and row entries generally increase in cynicism, although some of the figures are somewhat unreliable due to the insufficient number of cases in the cells.

The same basic relationship holds true in 1976 (Table 5b). Here one must take some care in evaluating the table due to the very few respondents who are in the "least distant" categories; an overall increase in dissatisfaction with the policies of the two major parties took place during the intervening years. There is again a monotonic increase in cynicism as one travels down the diagonal from cell 1,1 to cell 4,4, supporting the findings in 1970. As Miller (1974a:968) said:

These data thus provide strong evidence that those who feel neither party offers viable solutions to contemporary social problems are among the most synical, distrustful, and alienated citizens in the U.S. today. [Emphasis in the original.]

#### External Political Inefficacy and Policy Dissatisfaction

We have just seen that increases in policy

dissatisfaction leads to increasing political cynicism. Now, an attempt will be made to show that external political efficacy is related in a similar, though less definite manner.

Table 6a presents external political efficacy in 1970 by dissatisfaction with Republican Party policies. The mean inefficacy scores for the total cross-section rise monotonically starting with those second least dissatisfied (row 1). Those least dissatisfied show a slightly larger inefficacy value than the next least dissatisfied. Overall, however, as dissatisfaction increases, so does the level of political powerlessness.

Both white and black Democrats show slightly curvilinear patterns, though on opposite ends of the continuum. The most dissatisfied white Democrats are slightly less powerless than those next most dissatisfied. For blacks, the least dissatisfied are slightly more powerless than those next least dissatisfied. Republicans show a definite curvilinear relationship. The seven percent who are least dissatisfied with the policies of their party are the fourth most dissatisfied. As stated before, this is very likely to have been caused by the perception of the Democratic Congress refusing to pass Republican policy. The Democratic government is not responsive to the needs of the Republican Party and therefore to the needs of Republican Party

supporters. Finally, independents show a monotonic increase in inefficacy as policy distance increases.

Overall, therefore, a general relationship of increasing external political inefficacy with increasing distance from Republican policies exists. For the most part, this relationship holds for Democratic policies, also (Table 6b). For the total cross-section and white and black Democrats, inefficacy is always higher for those least distance from the Democratic Party policies than for those who are next least distant. From that point, the cross-section and black Democrat samples both increase in inefficacy of policy dissatisfaction increases. For white Democrats, those most dissatisfied are a bit more efficacious than those next least dissatisfied (1.86 from 2.00). This could be due to the low percentage of white Democrats in that category. Republicans show a monotonic increase until one reaches the most distant category, where inefficacy drops some. Independents show a completely monotonic increase in inefficacy

With both dissatisfaction with Republican and with Democrat policies, Republicans overall are the most externally politically efficacious. The associations are stronger for dissatisfaction from Republican policy than from Democratic policies, however; Eta for the cross-section is .21 for the former but only .12 for the latter. The only variation is for independents. There the relationship was stronger for Democratic policy dissatisfaction (.23 compared

to .21). The difference is small enough to be ignored, however.

In 1976, the overall relationship remains the same. It is somewhat more ambiguous for Republican policy dissatisfaction, however (Table 7a). The total cross-section shows curvilinearity at the least and most distant positions, probably due to the low number of people in those positions. The same occurs for white Democrats. Black Democrats and independents show decreasing inefficacy in the more distant positions. Republicans least dissatisfied with Republican policy are the most powerless. The next least distant Republicans have a mean value .73 less than the least distant (from 2.03 to 1.30). After that, inefficacy increases monotonically. In all cases, when the marginal distributions are taken into account, the relationships are basically as predicted: external political inefficacy is positively related to distance from the policy positions of the Republican Party.

Distance from the Democratic Party (Table 7b) is much more consistent. The total cross-section and white and black Democrats all show definite monotonic relationships. Black Democrats show the largest increase between least and most distant, from 1.44 to 2.28 on an .84 increase in external inefficacy. White Democrats run a close second, with a .77 increase in inefficacy. Republicans and independents both show slight curvilinear relationships; those least

dissatisfied tend to be a little higher in inefficacy than those next least distant. As in 1970, the Eta values are higher for Republican dissatisfaction than for Democratic. Unlike cynicism, however, the strength of the relationships did not really weaken very much between 1970 and 1976. Eta fell by only .03 between the years for both of the cross-sections.

External inefficacy and distance from both parties is presented in Table 8a for 1970 and Table 8b for 1976. Overall, as distance from both parties increase, so does inefficacy. This relationship is stronger for distance from the Republican Party than for the Democratic Party in 1970; each column is generally monotonic while each row breaks monotonicity. If one takes into account the small marginals in row and column 0 in 1976, the same monotonicity in the columns and non-monotonicity in the rows takes place. Not only those who feel that neither party offers viable solutions to social problems politically cynical, but they also tend to be externally inefficacious.

#### Internal Political Inefficacy and Policy Dissatisfaction

The relationships between policy dissatisfaction and internal political inefficacy are very different from those involving political cynicism and for external political inefficacy. Table 9a presents data for Republican Party policy dissatisfaction and internal inefficacy for 1970. All

of the subsamples have curvilinear relationships and one is even slightly negative. The total cross-section begins with a mean inefficacy value of 1.70 for those closest to Republican policy. The value drops for those next closest, and continues to rise until row 4, where it drops again, only to rise to 2.05 for those most distant from the perceived policies of the Republican Party. The last drop in the mean value was quite small and could be due to sampling error. Precisely the same basic relationship exists for white Democrats. Starting with an initial high value, inefficacy drops, then rises, then drops, and finally rises again. The overall relationship is positive but not very linear ( $r = .06$ ). For black Democrats, the relationship is again curvilinear, but generally positive in the direction hypothesized. Republicans begin with a monotonic relationship. Those fourth most distant (row 3) were lower in inefficacy than all other Republicans, however. The relationship for independents is actually slightly negative: as distance increase, inefficacy decreases ( $r = -.01$ ). The relationship is too curvilinear to suggest reasons for this phenomenon.

Democratic policy dissatisfaction is generally slightly negatively related to internal political inefficacy (Table 9b). The moderate Eta values reflect the curvilinear nature of the relationships. Substituting Pearson's  $r$  for Eta, we find  $r$  equals  $-.05$ ,  $-.04$ ,  $-.04$ ,  $-.02$ , and  $.04$ . These values are much lower and suggest that in 1970, policy distance from

the Democratic Party is basically unrelated to internal political inefficacy. Thus we see that internal political inefficacy is related positively, though slightly inconsistently, to Republican Party policy dissatisfaction but unrelated to distance from the Democratic Party position.

Evaluation of data from 1976 show the same results. In table 10a, one sees curvilinear but positive relationships. The most linear relationships are found for white Democrats and Republicans ( $r = .11$  and  $.12$ , respectively). The most curvilinear is the association between black Democrats and distance ( $\text{Eta} = .17$  while  $r$  only equals  $.09$ ).

Analyzing distance from Democratic policy (Table 10b), we see again that there is very little evidence of any linear relationship, except in the case of independents (if the marginal distributions are taken into account). The Eta values for the total cross-section and for the two Democratic subgroups are low; none is larger than  $.10$ . Only the Eta for independents really reaches any level of respectability. Pearson's  $r$  (reading from left to right) are only  $-.01$ ,  $.03$ ,  $-.001$ ,  $-.08$ , and  $.12$ . Overall, therefore, the data suggest that internal political inefficacy is related to dissatisfaction with Republican Party positions on issues and unrelated to distance from the perceived position from the Democratic Party's positions.

As before, we now examine the relationship between



internal political inefficacy and distance from both parties. In 1970 (Table 11a), there is a curvilinear relationship along the diagonal; those least dissatisfied and those most dissatisfied are the most powerless. People in the middle had higher levels of efficacy. Again, every column shows a general increase in inefficacy as distance increases. But no consistent relationship is found in any of the rows. Internal inefficacy is completely determined by distance from the Republican policy position. Data for 1976 is presented in Table 11b. There is no relationship between policy dissatisfaction from both parties and internal inefficacy; the inefficacy values fail to rise as one moves down the diagonal. There is a slight tendency in some columns for inefficacy to rise as distance from the Republican Party increases, however. What little increase in internal political inefficacy is due to policy dissatisfaction is from policy dissatisfaction from the Republican Party only.

#### Summary on the Effects of Policy Dissatisfaction

In summary, we have seen that political cynicism and external political inefficacy are related to feelings that government outputs are not satisfactory, at least as measured by policy dissatisfaction with the two major political parties. Internal political inefficacy is almost unrelated to the distance of the respondent's policy position from the perceived political parties' positions. A necessary question

to answer is how are we to explain the relationship between cynicism and external inefficacy with policy dissatisfaction. A party identification based interpretation is untenable; it would require a zero correlation between cynicism and distance from Democratic policies for Democrats and a zero correlation between Republican policies and Republicans, a position unsubstantiated in our analysis (see Miller, 1974a). All party identification groups tended to increase in these two dimensions of political alienation.

Individuals with extreme opinions may be more cynical because of a disjunction between the perceived and actual values and norms of society. These extremists may confuse ignorance of political norms with the conviction that no norms exist (McClosky and Schaar, 1965:33).

Miller (1974a) proposes and Citrin (1974) confirms that the relationships between cynicism and policy dissatisfaction can be explained by relative left-right orientations of people. "Cynics of the left" are those people who perceive the two parties as being too far to the right. "Cynics of the right" are those who see the parties as being too "leftist;" their distrust of the government stems from the belief that government administration is too liberal. People who were least distant from party positions did not see the parties as being too liberal or conservative and thus were not as cynical. This would be consistent no matter where the

respondent places himself on the liberal-conservative scale since distance is a relative measure and does not take into account the actual point of departure on the issue scales.

This left-right distinction implies that increases in cynicism and external inefficacy was the result of a combination of "unfulfilled expectations, and for others, the perception of their situation, which was already one of deprivation and discrimination, had actually worsened relative to that of others" (Miller, 1974a:969). But these feelings of relative deprivation and dissatisfaction may be due to other factors, too, factors such as educational level or income. House and Mason (1975) maintain that social location variables are relatively unimportant and that dissatisfaction with policy and its effect on cynicism are distributed across traditional demographic divisions. We still must compare social location variables with policy dissatisfaction in order to evaluate interactions between the two sets of variables and to determine which variables are more important in predicting political alienation.

#### THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL LOCATION VARIABLES AND POLICY DISSATISFACTION

The interaction of social location variables and policy dissatisfaction was examined by regressing education, income, race, sex, and the two measures of policy distance from the two major parties on the three measures of political

alienation. Variables in the equation had the following categories:

Distance from the Republican Party and Distance from the Democratic Party

0 = least distant to 6 = most distant

Education[24] 1 = eighth grade or less  
2 = some high school  
3 = high school graduate  
4 = some college  
5 = college graduate or more

Income 1 = low income  
2 = medium low income  
3 = medium income  
4 = medium high income  
5 = high income

Sex 0 = male  
1 = female

Race 0 = white  
1 = all other races

Results for political cynicism for the years 1970, 1972, 1974, and 1976 are presented in table 12a. Distance from the perceived policy position of the Republican Party is consistently the most powerful predictor of political cynicism judging by its beta weight[25]. As distance increases, so does cynicism. Education and distance from the

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[24]It is recognized that education and income are only ordinal level and thus violate some of the assumptions inherent in multiple regression. The number of categories each has and their fairly normal distribution allow their treatment as interval level, as long as it is remembered that they are only rough estimates.

[25]Beta is the standardized regression coefficient and determines the relative strength of each of the variables in the regression equation after partialing out the effects of all the other variables in the equation. The higher the absolute value of beta, the higher its predictive power given that set of variables. The sign of beta determines whether the variable is positively or negatively correlated with the dependent variable.

Democratic Party are the next most influential variables. As we saw in an earlier discussion of policy dissatisfaction, distance from the Democratic party is less important than distance from the Republican. Education is negatively correlated; as education increases, cynicism decreases. Income, sex, and race have little or no influence on cynicism[26]. The variance explained runs between eight and 15 percent.

Education is by far the best predictor of internal inefficacy (Table 12b). No other variable comes close to its predictive power. Income and to some extent race also have predictive power, but the policy dissatisfaction measures show very little influence. Internal political inefficacy seems to be mainly determined by social location variables and within those, by education. Seventeen to twenty-one percent of the variance was explained by the equations, most of it by education.

Education again has the greatest influence when examining external political inefficacy (Table 12c), followed by the two policy dissatisfaction variables. Sex has no influence and neither does race (except in 1974) or income (except in 1970). The determinants of external inefficacy

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[26]The relative unimportance of income compared to education parallels finding by Agger et al. (1961). They found educational attainment much more important than income even if income was controlled.

seem to be somewhere between those of internal inefficacy and cynicism, those tending toward the policy dissatisfaction orientation of political cynicism.

#### Summary

Overall, therefore, education is the most consistent predictor of political alienation. This is especially important when one realizes that the average level of education in the United States has increased and is continuing to increase. Policy dissatisfaction is most important for understanding political cynicism, not important at all in explaining internal political inefficacy, and somewhat important in predicting external political inefficacy. Trust in the government is most dependent on public satisfaction of policy outputs and then by education, perhaps because higher education allows the citizen to understand exactly what is involved in making policy outputs. Cognitive ability determines how powerful and politically effective one feels. And a combination of education and policy satisfaction predicts whether the citizen sees the government as responsive to his or her demands and needs. Race, contrary to the import given it in past studies, is not a strong predictor of political alienation.

## SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The results show that different dimensions of political alienation are interrelated with different social location and policy dissatisfaction variables in different ways. Political cynicism is greatly dependent upon policy dissatisfaction variables and education, while policy dissatisfaction has no influence on internal political inefficacy. External political inefficacy falls somewhere in the middle; it seems to be affected by both dissatisfaction and the individual's place in the social structure.

At the bivariate level education was related to all three measures of political alienation, but much more highly for the two efficacy scales than for cynicism. Income was similarly associated, although at a slightly weaker level. Blacks were consistently less efficacious than whites on both scales. The relationship between race and cynicism reverses in the late sixties, with blacks becoming more cynical. Overall, the relationships between race and political alienation were never as high as one reading the literature might expect. Still, dissatisfaction with government policy has made blacks one of the most cynical groups in society. Females were less personally politically powerful but sex

could not predict levels of cynicism or external political inefficacy. Subjective social class, like education and income, was consistently related to the three scales, though more for the efficacy measures than for cynicism.

Thus the social location of an individual is related to levels of internal inefficacy, external inefficacy, and cynicism. With the exception of race, the strengths of the associations remain relatively constant over the years. Because rising cynicism cuts across all demographic groups, the analysis of social location leaves us in the dark as to why it rose. The answer was found in dissatisfaction with government policy, operationalized as distance between the respondent and his perceptions of the policy positions of the Republican and Democratic Parties. Both in 1970 and 1976, political cynicism was associated with policy dissatisfaction. The higher the dissatisfaction, the higher the cynicism, even across race and party identification lines. More importantly, it was shown that dissatisfaction increased between 1970 and 1976, suggesting that the changing level of cynicism is a function of policy dissatisfaction. The relationship was consistently stronger for distance from the perceived position of the Republican Party than for the Democratic Party, perhaps because of the problems the Republican Party had getting policies passed through the Democratic-held Congress, or because of Republican follies like Watergate. External inefficacy was related in a similar



fashion although not as consistently. No relationship existed between internal political inefficacy and policy dissatisfaction, however.

Given that the predictive power of the two groups of variables depended on the measure of political alienation used, the interaction between social location and policy dissatisfaction were next examined. Policy dissatisfaction played the major role in predicting political cynicism, followed by education. Race, sex, and income were of little value. Education was by far the major predictor of internal political inefficacy. None of the other variables came close to explaining as much of the variance and policy dissatisfaction failed to provide any significant predictive power. The most variance in external inefficacy was explained by education also, but policy dissatisfaction was the second major predictor. Thus education was the most significant predictor overall, although policy dissatisfaction was more important in explaining cynicism and influential in predicting external inefficacy.

The importance of education on political alienation cannot be minimized. It has been shown that higher education levels are related to lower levels of political alienation. Because the average level of education in the United States has been rising, the effect has been to counteract the rising level of cynicism. If the average educational level had not

risen, we would be seeing much higher levels of cynicism today.

Rising education has made the public more tolerant of the government. But still, cynicism has risen. This is because a second major force, policy dissatisfaction, has been cutting across demographic divisions. Parties are no longer able to satisfy the demands of their constituents and people find little confidence in their ability to respond to their needs. As Miller (1974a:971) points out, this great dissatisfaction with the policies of both the Republican and Democratic parties implies "that conditions are highly conducive to party realignment and reformation or a third party movement"[28] Trust cannot continue to erode. Some sort of reformation must take place. Perhaps President Carter's attempts to bring government closer to the people will succeed in placating people. This is unlikely unless he can bring a new unity to issues: charismatic leadership may cause a temporary reduction in cynicism, but does not solve the underlying problems. Perhaps the best policies to be followed by the government would attempt to relieve feelings of relative deprivation, not only among the poor, but also within the working and middle classes.

A second major concern is the effect rising educational opportunities will have on aggregate levels of efficacy. No

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[28]Although Iadd and Hadley (1975) argue that some party realignment has already occurred.

really significant changes have taken place in levels of internal or external efficacy, perhaps because of the counter-tendencies of policy dissatisfaction. But if policy dissatisfaction decreases or the average level of education increases greatly, there will be more people who feel they have the ability to influence the government and who feel that the government is responsive. The implications are important; increasing perceptions of power, coupled with high levels of cynicism may create a tense political climate and an increase in the number of demands on the government.

With the ever increasing levels of cynicism, why has the United States not succumbed to violent anti-government movements? Cynicism is high and policy dissatisfaction has been growing. Several reasons may be suggested. First, neither internal nor external inefficacy has shown a significant increase in the past quarter century. People generally still feel they have some control over the government and that the government is to some extent still responsive. The political system is not bad, at least yet. The cynicism seems more directed toward government officials. People may be alienated from those who occupy official positions in the political system and their policy outputs rather than from the political system itself. They still retain their national political identity of being "American." As Easton (1965) argued, distrust is first directed at the authorities, then to the political system, and finally to the political community. The constant level of efficacy has

prevented cynicism from extending past the first level. If the increase in cynicism continues, the public may eventually become estranged from the political system.

Table 1. Coefficients of Reproducibility and Scalability for the Dependent Variables Scales

Year	<u>Cynicism</u>		<u>Internal Inefficacy</u>		<u>External Inefficacy</u>	
	Reproduc- ibility	Scala- bility	Reproduc- ibility	Scala- bility	Reproduc- ibility	Scala- bility
1952			.909	.648		
1956			.892	.641		
1958	.843	.494				
1960			.887	.637		
1964	.825	.445	.884	.608		
1966			.886	.572		
1968	.796	.455	.881	.687	.868	.708
1970	.798	.506	.884	.660	.894	.756
1972	.804	.508	.873	.636	.905	.767
1974	.795	.446	.857	.595	.912	.769
1976	.808	.439	.867	.648	.896	.725

Table 2. Mean Values of Political Cynicism, Internal Political Inefficacy, and External Political Inefficacy by Year

Year	<u>Cynicism*</u>		<u>Internal Inefficacy**</u>		<u>External Inefficacy**</u>	
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)
1952			1.84	1761		
1956			1.65	1743		
1958	2.12	1658				
1960			1.58	1918		
1964	1.58	4161	1.69	4620		
1966			1.75	1256		
1968	1.88	2578	1.68	2655	1.44	2617
1970	2.45	1636	1.58	1687	1.67	1655
1972	2.45	2188	1.60	2686	1.59	2650
1974	2.97	2420	1.73	2484	1.77	2434
1976	3.02	2723	1.41	2830	1.53	2780

\*The cynicism scale ranges from 0 = low cynicism to 5 = high cynicism.

\*\*The two inefficacy scales ranges from 0 = low inefficacy to 3 = high inefficacy.

Figure 1. Mean Political Cynicism by Sex, 1958 to 1976




Figure 2. Mean External Political Inefficacy by Sex, 1968 to 1976






Figure 3. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by Sex, 1952 to 1976




Figure 4. Mean Political Cynicism by Race, 1958 to 1976




Figure 5. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by Race, 1952 to 1976




Figure 6. Mean External Political Inefficacy by Race, 1968 to 1976




Figure 7. Mean Political Cynicism by Educational Level, 1958 to 1976




Figure 8. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by Educational Level, 1952 to 1976




Figure 9. Mean External Political Inefficacy by Educational Level, 1968 to 1976




Figure 10. Mean Political Cynicism by  
Income, 1958 to 1976






Figure 11. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by Family Income, 1952 to 1976




Figure 12. Mean External Political Inefficacy by Family Income, 1968 to 1976




Figure 13. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by Subjective Social Class, 1952 to 1976




Figure 14. Mean External Political Inefficacy by Subjective Social Class, 1968 to 1976




Figure 15. Mean Political Cynicism by Subjective Social Class, 1958 to 1976




Table 3a. Mean Cynicism by Distance from Republican Party, 1970

Distance from Republican Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	1.77	3.9	1.09	2.3	1.33	3.1	2.00	6.9	2.08	3.3
1	1.85	28.2	1.66	20.1	1.55	18.9	1.93	47.6	1.91	26.4
2	2.37	36.2	2.40	37.3	2.32	35.5	2.31	34.6	2.40	39.4
3	2.85	21.1	2.84	25.7	2.97	24.0	2.44	8.6	2.89	23.1
4	3.26	7.8	3.23	11.3	3.39	12.7	2.40	1.7	3.36	5.9
5	3.43	2.3	3.42	2.4	3.48	4.6	**	----	3.67	1.5
6	4.21	5.4	**	----	4.00	1.2	**	----	**	----

Group Mean  
and Total

Percent	2.40	104.9	2.47	99.1	2.51	100.0	2.12	99.4	2.45	9.6
(N)	(1472)		(573)		(417)		(361)		(454)	
Eta	.31		.36		.42		.15		.29	

\*Cell entries are mean cynicism values. The cynicism scale ranges from 0 = least cynical to 5=most cynical.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 3b. Mean Cynicism by Distance from Republican Party, 1976

Distance from Republican Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	2.38	2.2	2.55	1.2	**	----	2.28	4.3	2.43	2.2
1	2.49	31.4	2.54	20.7	2.52	19.9	2.36	52.2	2.63	30.7
2	3.07	38.4	3.05	37.8	3.14	34.6	2.71	34.8	3.27	44.3
3	3.37	20.1	3.28	28.5	3.25	28.6	3.34	7.9	3.48	19.2
4	3.69	5.6	3.83	8.8	3.45	11.1	**	----	4.13	2.4
5	4.06	1.8	3.81	3.2	3.92	3.1	**	----	4.50	1.2
6	**	----	**	----	3.76	2.2	**	----	**	----

Group Mean  
and Total

Percent	2.99	99.5	3.10	100.2	3.12	99.5	2.56	99.2	3.14	100.0
(N)	(1440)		(502)		(413)		(368)		(499)	
Eta	.27		.27		.23		.18		.27	

\*Cell entries are mean cynicism values. The cynicism scale ranges from 0 = least cynical to 5=most cynical.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 4a. Mean Cynicism by Distance from Democratic Party, 1970

Distance from Democratic Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	2.11	7.8	2.15	11.2	2.01	13.7	2.00	2.1	2.00	4.2
1	2.15	32.9	2.26	44.0	2.29	40.8	1.72	16.4	1.96	29.2
2	2.44	35.3	2.63	33.2	2.71	33.5	1.94	39.9	2.47	37.1
3	2.71	17.4	3.02	9.6	3.09	10.6	2.25	27.3	2.91	21.7
4	3.06	4.7	3.71	1.4	**	----	2.64	8.8	3.33	6.5
5	3.15	1.6	**	----	**	----	2.92	4.7	3.67	1.1
6	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----

Group Mean  
and Total

Percent	2.41	99.7	2.47	99.4	2.51	99.2	2.09	99.2	2.47	99.8
(N)	(1456)		(582)		(424)		(341)		(448)	
Eta	.17		.21		.25		.21		.28	

\*Cell entries are mean cynicism values. The cynicism scale ranges from 0 = least cynical to 5=most cynical.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.



Table 4b. Mean Cynicism by Distance from Democratic Party, 1976

Distance from Democratic Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	2.77	2.3	2.19	2.2	2.89	4.4	**	----	2.59	2.2
1	2.90	31.5	3.08	43.5	3.09	40.5	2.19	14.2	2.82	30.7
2	2.97	41.9	3.14	39.9	3.17	39.8	2.38	42.2	3.12	45.4
3	3.12	17.4	3.35	12.6	3.37	12.9	2.67	30.3	3.56	14.3
4	3.27	5.4	3.10	2.0	3.00	2.2	3.03	10.6	3.64	5.8
5	3.63	1.5	**	----	**	----	3.52	3.3	4.13	1.6
6	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----

Group Mean  
and Total

Percent	2.99	100.0	3.11	100.2	3.14	99.8	2.54	100.6	3.13	100.0
(N)	(1433)		(499)		(410)		(360)		(502)	
Eta	.09		.13		.10		.19		.20	

\*Cell entries are mean cynicism values. The cynicism scale ranges from 0 = least cynical to 5=most cynical.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 5a. Mean Political Cynicism by Distance  
from Both Parties, 1970

Distance from Republican Party	<u>Distance from Democratic Party</u>					Total
	0	1	2	3	4	
0	2.25* (1.7%)	2.00 (0.4)	2.57 (0.6)	2.00 (0.1)	3.67 (0.3)	2.39 (3.1)
1	1.81 (1.4)	2.28 (10.6)	2.30 (7.0)	2.74 (3.8)	2.00 (1.0)	2.32 (23.7)
2	2.69 (1.4)	2.58 (10.0)	2.65 (16.5)	2.90 (5.9)	3.22 (1.6)	2.70 (35.4)
3	2.56 (1.4)	2.99 (6.6)	3.10 (7.9)	3.10 (5.9)	3.25 (2.1)	3.05 (23.8)
4	3.50 (2.1)	3.21 (4.5)	3.65 (4.2)	3.79 (1.7)	4.39 (1.6)	3.58 (14.1)
Total	2.63 (8.0%)	2.65 (32.1)	2.79 (36.2)	3.02 (17.2)	3.35 (6.4)	2.81 (100.0%)

Eta = .027

N=1145

\*Cell entries are mean cynicism values. The cynicism scale ranged from 0 = least cynical to 5 = most cynical. The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of cases in each cell.

Table 5b. Mean Political Cynicism by Distance  
from Both Parties, 1976

Distance from Republican Party	<u>Distance from Democratic Party</u>					<u>Total</u>
	0	1	2	3	4	
0	3.38* (0.3%)	2.40 (0.4)	3.47 (0.7)	4.00 (0.2)	3.25 (0.3)	3.23 (1.8)
1	4.00 (0.4)	2.78 (11.0)	2.82 (10.3)	2.94 (5.5)	2.97 (2.5)	2.85 (29.6)
2	4.00 (0.2)	3.17 (10.1)	3.24 (19.7)	3.21 (6.5)	3.37 (2.8)	3.23 (39.4)
3	1.00 (0.2)	3.36 (6.4)	3.39 (8.4)	3.74 (4.8)	4.26 (1.2)	3.50 (20.9)
4	4.23 (0.8)	3.52 (3.5)	4.27 (2.8)	3.83 (0.9)	4.50 (0.4)	3.92 (8.4)
Total	3.81 (1.8%)	3.10 (31.3)	3.24 (41.9)	3.31 (17.8)	3.44 (7.1)	3.23 (100.0%)
Eta = .012						N=1302

\*Cell entries are mean cynicism values. The cynicism scale ranged from 0 = least cynical to 5=most cynical. The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of cases in each cell.

Table 6a. Mean External Inefficacy by Distance  
from Republican Party, 1970

Distance from Republican Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	1.38	3.9	.91	2.3	1.33	3.1	1.62	6.9	1.12	3.3
1	1.26	28.2	1.23	20.1	1.07	19.0	1.27	47.6	1.22	26.4
2	1.52	36.1	1.56	37.4	1.59	35.6	1.39	34.3	1.53	39.3
3	1.81	21.2	1.84	25.5	2.07	24.0	1.57	8.9	1.69	23.5
4	1.98	7.7	1.94	11.4	2.01	12.7	2.90	1.7	1.76	5.9
5	2.20	2.3	1.63	2.4	2.12	4.6	**	----	2.67	1.5
6	**	----	**	----	2.33	1.2	**	----	**	----
Group Mean and Total										
Percent	1.56	99.4	1.60	99.1	1.68	100.2	1.40	99.4	1.51	99.9
(N)	(1471)		(572)		(416)		(361)		(455)	
Eta	.21		.21		.31		.21		.21	

\*Cell entries are mean external inefficacy values. The external inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 6b. Mean External Inefficacy by Distance  
from Republican Party, 1976

Distance from Republican Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	1.78	2.2	1.64	1.2	**	----	2.03	4.3	1.48	2.2
1	1.47	31.4	1.41	20.6	1.41	19.9	1.30	52.0	1.73	3.08
2	1.83	38.6	1.91	38.1	1.91	34.9	1.75	34.9	1.82	44.5
3	1.97	19.8	1.83	28.3	2.03	28.1	1.84	7.8	2.15	1.91
4	2.14	5.5	2.19	8.6	2.16	11.1	**	----	2.22	2.4
5	1.92	1.8	2.13	3.2	2.08	3.1	**	----	1.58	1.2
6	**	----	**	----	1.59	2.2	**	----	**	----
Group Mean and Total										
Percent	1.76	99.3	1.81	100.0	1.87	99.3	1.54	99.0	1.86	100.2
(N)	(1446)		(499)		(413)		(373)		(503)	
Eta	.19		.21		.22		.23		.15	

\*Cell entries are mean external inefficacy values. The external inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 7a. Mean External Inefficacy by Distance  
from Democratic Party, 1970

Distance from Republican Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	1.64	7.8	1.63	11.2	1.83	13.7	1.00	2.1	1.29	4.2
1	1.44	32.7	1.47	44.0	1.49	40.8	1.25	16.4	1.29	29.2
2	1.51	35.6	1.60	33.3	1.71	33.7	1.28	40.5	1.51	37.0
3	1.65	17.4	2.00	9.5	2.18	10.4	1.38	26.7	1.63	22.3
4	2.02	4.6	1.86	1.3	**	----	1.88	8.8	2.21	6.5
5	2.03	1.6	**	----	**	----	1.62	4.7	3.00	1.1
6	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----

Group Mean  
and Total

Percent	1.56	99.7	1.59	99.3	1.69	98.6	1.37	99.2	1.52	100.3
(N)	(1456)		(582)		(424)		(341)		(449)	
Eta	.12		.13		.18		.16		.23	

\*Cell entries are mean external inefficacy values. The external inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 7b. Mean External Inefficacy by Distance  
from Democratic Party, 1976

Distance from Republican Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	1.57	2.4	1.58	2.4	1.44	4.9	**	----	1.86	2.2
1	1.68	31.6	1.58	42.9	1.77	39.8	1.55	14.5	1.75	31.2
2	1.76	41.9	1.91	40.0	1.88	40.3	1.48	41.8	1.81	45.3
3	1.89	17.5	2.21	12.7	2.25	12.9	1.46	30.1	2.24	14.2
4	1.94	5.4	2.35	2.0	2.28	2.2	1.65	10.7	2.19	5.7
5	2.27	1.5	**	----	**	----	2.35	3.3	2.19	1.6
6	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----

Group Mean  
and Total

Percent	1.77	100.3	1.81	100.0	1.87	100.1	1.53	100.4	1.88	100.2
(N)	(1443)		(497)		(412)		(366)		(506)	
Eta	.09		.20		.17		.14		.16	

\*Cell entries are mean external inefficacy values. The external inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 8a. Mean External Political Inefficacy by Distance  
from Both Parties, 1970

Distance from Republican Party	<u>Distance from Democratic Party</u>					<u>Total</u>
	0	1	2	3	4	
0	2.29* (1.8%)	2.00 (0.4)	1.71 (0.7)	2.00 (0.1)	3.00 (0.3)	2.19 (3.4)
1	2.31 (1.4)	2.14 (9.7)	1.89 (6.9)	1.97 (3.6)	2.29 (0.7)	2.05 (22.3)
2	2.31 (1.7)	2.01 (10.1)	2.15 (16.0)	2.19 (5.5)	2.80 (1.6)	2.15 (34.8)
3	2.27 (1.6)	2.35 (6.7)	2.46 (7.5)	2.33 (6.0)	2.33 (2.2)	2.37 (24.0)
4	2.76 (2.2)	2.40 (4.8)	2.33 (4.6)	2.56 (1.9)	2.47 (2.0)	2.46 (15.4)
Total	2.41 (8.7%)	2.18 (31.6)	2.18 (35.7)	2.23 (17.1)	2.51 (6.9)	2.23 (100.0%)

Eta = .027

N=945

\*Cell entries are mean external inefficacy values. The efficacy scale ranged from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious. The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of cases in each cell.



Table 8b. Mean External Political Inefficacy by Distance  
from Both Parties, 1976

Distance from Republican Party	<u>Distance from Democratic Party</u>					<u>Total</u>
	0	1	2	3	4	
0	1.75* (0.4%)	2.33 (0.5)	2.18 (0.8)	2.43 (0.4)	2.25 (0.4)	2.19 (2.3)
1	2.00 (0.5)	1.98 (10.7)	2.04 (9.9)	1.90 (4.9)	2.27 (2.5)	2.01 (28.4)
2	2.33 (0.4)	2.14 (10.0)	2.20 (20.3)	2.14 (6.7)	2.40 (2.8)	2.19 (40.2)
3	3.00 (0.2)	2.41 (5.1)	2.30 (8.4)	2.53 (5.4)	2.63 (1.2)	2.41 (20.2)
4	2.11 (0.9)	2.35 (3.5)	2.15 (3.2)	2.46 (1.1)	2.50 (0.4)	2.28 (9.0)
Total	2.12 (2.3%)	2.16 (29.8)	2.18 (42.4)	2.21 (18.4)	2.39 (7.2)	2.19 (100.0%)
Eta = .012						N=1136

\*Cell entries are mean external efficacy values. The inefficacy scale ranged from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious. The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of cases in each cell.

Table 9a. Mean Internal Inefficacy by Distance  
from Republican Party, 1970

Distance from Republican Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	1.70	4.0	1.77	2.3	1.90	3.1	1.41	7.0	1.85	3.5
1	1.49	28.2	1.61	19.9	1.52	18.8	1.45	47.7	1.41	26.3
2	1.54	36.2	1.56	37.8	1.58	36.0	1.50	34.4	1.51	39.1
3	1.69	21.1	1.82	25.5	1.84	23.8	1.39	8.7	1.57	23.3
4	1.65	7.7	1.59	11.3	1.78	12.6	3.00	1.6	1.31	5.9
5	2.05	2.3	1.88	2.4	2.26	4.5	**	----	1.67	1.5
6	**	----	**	----	2.22	1.2	**	----	**	----
Group Mean and Total										
Percent	1.59	99.5	1.66	99.2	1.70	100.0	1.49	99.4	1.50	99.3
(N)	(1490)		(577)		(420)		(369)		(460)	
Eta	.11		.13		.19		.20		.11	

\*Cell entries are mean internal inefficacy values. The internal inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 9b. Mean Internal Inefficacy by Distance  
from Republican Party, 1976

Distance from Republican Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	1.33	2.2	1.27	1.2	**	----	1.41	4.3	1.24	2.2
1	1.32	31.3	1.36	20.6	1.41	19.7	1.30	52.0	1.32	30.4
2	1.58	38.8	1.64	38.2	1.73	35.0	1.43	35.2	1.59	44.9
3	1.69	19.9	1.57	28.3	1.65	28.5	1.91	7.7	1.79	19.0
4	1.77	5.5	1.70	8.7	2.01	11.0	**	----	1.35	2.4
5	1.50	1.8	1.97	3.2	1.72	3.1	**	----	.67	1.2
6	**	----	**	----	1.47	2.2	**	----	**	----
Group Mean and Total										
Percent	1.52	99.5	1.58	100.2	1.67	99.5	1.40	99.2	1.52	100.1
(N)	(1458)		(505)		(417)		(375)		(506)	
Eta	.15		.14		.17		.15		.19	

\*Cell entries are mean internal inefficacy values. The internal inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 10a. Mean Internal Inefficacy by Distance  
from Democratic Party, 1970

Distance from Republican Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	2.01	7.9	2.03	11.1	2.02	13.6	1.57	2.3	1.91	4.4
1	1.55	32.7	1.57	44.2	1.67	41.2	1.48	16.0	1.43	28.9
2	1.58	35.3	1.64	33.1	1.64	33.5	1.56	39.8	1.49	37.2
3	1.48	17.4	1.77	9.4	1.85	10.3	1.30	27.2	1.44	22.0
4	1.65	4.7	1.71	1.4	**	----	1.57	8.9	1.71	6.4
5	1.72	1.6	**	----	**	----	1.53	4.6	2.56	1.1
6	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----

Group Mean  
and Total

Percent	1.59	99.6	1.66	99.2	1.73	98.6	1.48	98.8	1.51	100.0
(N)	(1474)		(586)		(427)		(349)		(454)	
Eta	.13		.15		.15		.11		.16	

\*Cell entries are mean internal inefficacy values. The internal inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 10b. Mean Internal Inefficacy by Distance  
from Democratic Party, 1976

Distance from Democratic Party	Total Cross- Section		White Democrats		Black Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Mean*	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%	Mean	%
0	1.55	2.4	1.58	2.4	1.56	4.8	**	----	1.59	2.2
1	1.50	31.8	1.50	43.2	1.68	40.4	1.70	14.9	1.28	31.2
2	1.55	41.8	1.63	39.8	1.66	40.0	1.37	41.8	1.58	45.4
3	1.46	17.3	1.66	12.5	1.79	12.7	1.27	29.9	1.62	14.2
4	1.56	5.4	1.20	2.0	1.11	2.2	1.39	10.6	1.91	5.7
5	1.39	1.4	**	----	**	----	1.43	3.3	1.25	1.6
6	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----	**	----

Group Mean  
and Total

Percent	1.52	100.1	1.57	99.9	1.67	100.1	1.39	100.5	1.51	100.3
(N)	(1453)		(502)		(416)		(368)		(507)	
Eta	.04		.09		.10		.13		.17	

\*Cell entries are mean internal inefficacy values. The internal inefficacy scale ranges from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious.

\*\*N was less than 5 or less than one percent of the total.

Table 11a. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by Distance  
from Both Parties, 1970

Distance from Republican Party	<u>Distance from Democratic Party</u>					<u>Total</u>
	0	1	2	3	4	
0	2.07* (2.4%)	1.71 (0.6)	2.00 (0.8)	1.00 (0.1)	2.00 (0.3)	1.98 (4.2)
1	2.00 (1.9)	1.88 (12.1)	1.84 (7.2)	1.55 (3.4)	1.64 (1.0)	1.82 (25.6)
2	2.18 (1.5)	1.90 (9.9)	1.87 (16.0)	1.92 (5.5)	1.83 (1.6)	1.90 (34.4)
3	2.27 (1.3)	1.96 (6.2)	1.99 (7.4)	1.92 (5.7)	2.00 (1.8)	1.98 (22.4)
4	2.31 (2.3)	2.06 (4.2)	2.02 (4.0)	2.23 (1.2)	2.28 (1.6)	2.13 (13.4)
Total	2.16 (9.5%)	1.92 (33.0)	1.91 (35.4)	1.86 (15.8)	1.97 (6.3)	1.93 (100.0%)
Eta = .039						N=1115

\*Cell entries are mean internal inefficacy values. The efficacy scale ranged from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious. The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of cases in each cell.

Table 11b. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by Distance  
from Both Parties, 1976

Distance from Republican Party	<u>Distance from Democratic Party</u>					<u>Total</u>
	0	1	2	3	4	
0	1.38* (0.4%)	1.73 (0.7)	1.80 (0.4)	1.43 (0.4)	2.00 (0.4)	1.69 (2.1)
1	1.88 (0.7)	1.73 (11.8)	1.81 (9.9)	1.68 (4.1)	1.89 (2.5)	1.77 (28.9)
2	2.00 (0.5)	1.86 (10.0)	2.00 (20.7)	1.89 (5.9)	1.65 (2.6)	1.92 (39.7)
3	** ----	1.84 (6.2)	1.92 (8.9)	2.07 (5.2)	2.31 (1.1)	1.95 (21.4)
4	1.68 (1.1)	2.35 (2.9)	1.84 (2.7)	2.45 (1.0)	2.00 (0.4)	2.08 (8.0)
Total	1.75 (2.7%)	1.85 (31.6)	1.92 (42.5)	1.92 (16.3)	1.88 (6.7)	1.89 (100.0%)
Eta = .016						N=1140

\*Cell entries are mean internal efficacy values. The inefficacy scale ranged from 0 = least inefficacious to 3 = most inefficacious. The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of cases in each cell.  
\*\*No cases.

Table 12a. Multiple Regression of Social Location Variables  
and Policy Dissatisfaction on Political Cynicism

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	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1976</u>
Distance from Republican Party	.269*	.329	.150	.238
Distance from Democratic Party	.139	.044	.137	.111
Education	-.130	-.132	-.130	-.116
Income	-.067	-.042	-.033	.010
Sex	.017	-.043	.030	.070
Race	.024	.036	.052	.034
R-square	.138	.148	.079	.097
(N)	(1389)	(1360)	(1478)	(1329)

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\*Beta weights (standardized regression coefficients).



Table 12b. Multiple Regression of Social Location Variables  
and Policy Dissatisfaction on Internal Inefficacy

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	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1976</u>
Distance from Republican Party	.027*	.064	.011	.037
Distance from Democratic Party	.005	.046	.028	.031
Education	-.388	-.334	-.346	-.379
Income	-.089	-.106	-.063	-.070
Sex	.092	.034	.045	.026
Race	.061	.063	.112	.037
R-square	.214	.170	.169	.183
(N)	(1406)	(1370)	(1483)	(1344)

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\*Beta weights (standardized regression coefficients).

Table 12c. Multiple Regression of Social Location Variables  
and Policy Dissatisfaction on External Inefficacy

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1976</u>
Distance from Republican Party	.144*	.180	.084	.105
Distance from Democratic Party	.092	.073	.087	.129
Education	-.248	-.224	-.279	-.195
Income	-.124	-.055	-.034	-.096
Sex	-.053	-.025	-.068	-.053
Race	.066	.076	.137	.012
R-square (N)	.156 (1389)	.122 (1367)	.141 (1474)	.095 (1338)

\*Beta weights (standardized regression coefficients).

## APPENDIX

This appendix reports the data used in Figures 1 through 15. All values refer to mean levels of political cynicism, internal political inefficacy, or external political inefficacy. Numbers in parenthesis refer to the Ns in each category. The cynicism scale ranges from 0 = low cynicism to 5 = high cynicism. Both of the inefficacy scales range from 0 = low inefficacy to 3 = high inefficacy. The tables are in the same order as the presentation of the figures.

Table A.1. Mean Political Cynicism by Sex, 1958 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1958 -----	MEAN (N) 1964 -----	MEAN (N) 1968 -----	MEAN (N) 1970 -----	MEAN (N) 1972 -----	MEAN (N) 1974 -----	MEAN (N) 1976 -----
Male	2.12 ( 797)	1.54 (1885)	1.76 (1144)	2.43 ( 795)	2.45 ( 953)	2.91 (1030)	2.96 (1164)
Female	2.12 ( 861)	1.57 (2276)	1.56 (1434)	2.40 (1015)	2.45 (1235)	3.01 (1390)	3.07 (1559)
Eta=	.002	.011	.077	.009	.002	.034	.035

Table A.2. Mean External Political Inefficacy by  
Sex, 1958 to 1976

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	MEAN (N) 1968 -----	MEAN (N) 1970 -----	MEAN (N) 1972 -----	MEAN (N) 1974 -----	MEAN (N) 1976 -----
Male	1.42 (1151)	1.69 ( 806)	1.74 (1151)	1.87 (1033)	1.51 (1179)
Female	1.45 (1466)	1.58 (1027)	1.75 (1499)	1.70 (1401)	1.66 (1601)
Eta=	.013	.044	.004	.073	.015

Table a.3. Mean Internal Political Political Inefficacy by Sex, 1952 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1952 ----	MEAN (N) 1956 ----	MEAN (N) 1960 ----	MEAN (N) 1964 ----	MEAN (N) 1966 ----	MEAN (N) 1968 ----	MEAN (N) 1970 ----	MEAN (N) 1972 ----	MEAN (N) 1974 ----	MEAN (N) 1976 ----
Male	1.71 ( 811)	1.50 ( 780)	1.50 ( 867)	1.61 (2093)	1.63 ( 557)	1.55 (1155)	1.55 ( 814)	1.64 (1162)	1.65 (1052)	1.31 (1197)
Female	1.95 ( 950)	1.77 ( 963)	1.65 (1051)	1.76 (2527)	1.85 ( 699)	1.78 (1500)	1.76 (1053)	1.85 (1424)	1.79 (1432)	1.98 (1634)
Eta=	.140	.144	.082	.077	.110	.110	.105	.108	.075	.075

Table A.4. Mean Political Cynicism by Race, 1958 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1958 -----	MEAN (N) 1964 -----	MEAN (N) 1968 -----	MEAN (N) 1970 -----	MEAN (N) 1972 -----	MEAN (N) 1974 -----	MEAN (N) 1976 -----
White	2.11 (1502)	1.59 (3768)	1.69 (2322)	2.36 (1619)	2.37 (1956)	2.93 (2167)	2.98 (2394)
Non-white	2.20 ( 156)	1.27 ( 393)	1.29 ( 256)	2.85 ( 191)	3.12 ( 232)	3.29 ( 242)	3.34 ( 307)
Eta=	.018	.060	.096	.094	.142	.071	.076

Table a.5. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by Race, 1952 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1952 -----	MEAN (N) 1956 -----	MEAN (N) 1960 -----	MEAN (N) 1964 -----	MEAN (N) 1966 -----	MEAN (N) 1968 -----	MEAN (N) 1970 -----	MEAN (N) 1972 -----	MEAN (N) 1974 -----	MEAN (N) 1976 -----
White	1.80 (1593)	1.60 (1597)	1.55 (1737)	1.67 (4170)	1.72 (1113)	1.64 (2382)	1.63 (1670)	1.72 (2382)	1.70 (2226)	1.40 (2467)
Non-white	2.28 ( 167)	2.21 ( 146)	1.86 ( 181)	1.91 ( 450)	2.01 ( 143)	2.07 ( 273)	2.02 ( 197)	2.04 ( 304)	2.06 ( 246)	1.45 ( 339)
Eta=	.168	.179	.097	.076	.095	.124	.121	.100	.110	.013



Table A.6. Mean External Political Inefficacy  
by Race, 1958 to 1976

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	MEAN (N) 1968 ----	MEAN (N) 1970 ----	MEAN (N) 1972 ----	MEAN (N) 1974 ----	MEAN (N) 1976 ----
White	1.40 (2350)	1.57 (1640)	1.68 (2352)	1.72 (2177)	1.53 (2433)
Non-white	1.78 ( 267)	2.13 ( 193)	2.26 ( 298)	2.30 ( 245)	1.53 ( 325)
Eta=	.097	.143	.155	.149	.001

Table A.7. Mean Political Cynicism by Education, 1958 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1958 ----	MEAN (N) 1964 ----	MEAN (N) 1968 ----	MEAN (N) 1970 ----	MEAN (N) 1972 ----	MEAN (N) 1974 ----	MEAN (N) 1976 ----
Less than 8th grade	2.37 ( 467)	1.71 ( 974)	1.90 ( 549)	2.83 ( 408)	2.78 ( 397)	3.26 ( 432)	3.32 ( 426)
Some high school	2.14 ( 306)	1.54 ( 822)	1.72 ( 463)	2.57 ( 293)	2.54 ( 388)	3.26 ( 412)	3.23 ( 389)
High school graduate	2.02 ( 523)	1.41 (1343)	1.54 ( 817)	2.25 ( 635)	2.45 ( 719)	2.98 ( 802)	3.04 (1004)
Some college	2.09 ( 181)	1.69 ( 518)	1.70 ( 389)	2.20 ( 268)	2.29 ( 371)	2.69 ( 400)	2.91 ( 453)
College graduate or more	1.74 ( 168)	1.56 ( 479)	1.39 ( 359)	2.13 ( 202)	2.12 ( 311)	2.59 ( 355)	2.62 ( 440)
Eta	.132	.080	.131	.164	.125	.166	.147

Table a.8. Mean Internal Political Inefficacy by Education, 1952 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1952 -----	MEAN (N) 1956 -----	MEAN (N) 1960 -----	MEAN (N) 1964 -----	MEAN (N) 1966 -----	MEAN (N) 1968 -----	MEAN (N) 1970 -----	MEAN (N) 1972 -----	MEAN (N) 1974 -----	MEAN (N) 1976 -----
Less than high school	2.14 ( 710)	2.14 ( 528)	1.95 ( 572)	2.20 (1133)	2.22 ( 315)	2.28 ( 596)	2.21 ( 433)	2.27 ( 526)	2.29 ( 448)	1.73 ( 474)
Some high school	1.82 ( 359)	1.66 ( 668)	1.72 ( 363)	1.91 ( 898)	2.00 ( 229)	2.03 ( 481)	2.00 ( 302)	2.09 ( 479)	1.95 ( 427)	1.71 ( 412)
High school graduate	1.69 ( 426)	1.55 ( 210)	1.49 ( 558)	1.58 (1455)	1.69 ( 408)	1.58 ( 824)	1.60 ( 644)	1.76 ( 890)	1.81 ( 826)	1.49 (1022)
Some college	1.45 ( 148)	.99 ( 189)	1.15 ( 230)	1.24 ( 590)	1.25 ( 177)	1.29 ( 392)	1.20 ( 275)	1.37 ( 435)	1.35 ( 405)	1.26 ( 462)
College graduate or more	1.08 ( 114)	.82 ( 141)	1.01 ( 194)	1.01 ( 512)	.97 ( 121)	.87 ( 361)	.85 ( 207)	1.01 ( 353)	1.00 ( 359)	.79 ( 448)
Eta=	.358	.443	.341	.417	.417	.444	.437	.410	.418	.277

Table A.9. Mean External Political Inefficacy  
by Education, 1958 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1968 -----	MEAN (N) 1970 -----	MEAN (N) 1972 -----	MEAN (N) 1974 -----	MEAN (N) 1976 -----
Less than 8th grade	1.99 ( 574)	2.17 ( 427)	2.29 ( 506)	2.36 ( 444)	1.73 ( 459)
Some high school	1.75 ( 476)	1.82 ( 295)	2.01 ( 473)	2.04 ( 412)	1.79 ( 400)
High school graduate	1.30 ( 821)	1.52 ( 632)	1.67 ( 883)	1.78 ( 813)	1.53 (1009)
Some college	1.14 ( 390)	1.24 ( 273)	1.40 ( 433)	1.40 ( 397)	1.49 ( 455)
College graduate or more	.79 ( 355)	1.02 ( 201)	1.20 ( 352)	1.12 ( 355)	1.16 ( 445)
Eta	.337	.309	.303	.340	.158

Table A.10. Mean Political Cynicism by Family Income,  
1958 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1958 ----	MEAN (N) 1964 ----	MEAN (N) 1968 ----	MEAN (N) 1970 ----	MEAN (N) 1972 ----	MEAN (N) 1974 ----	MEAN (N) 1976 ----
Low income	2.41 ( 233)	1.82 ( 745)	1.70 ( 589)	2.72 ( 359)	2.63 ( 371)	3.16 ( 491)	3.07 ( 565)
Medium low income	2.19 ( 331)	1.43 ( 721)	1.75 ( 338)	2.45 ( 437)	2.30 ( 499)	3.22 ( 421)	3.11 ( 443)
Medium Income	2.00 ( 466)	1.49 (1062)	1.67 ( 670)	2.53 ( 279)	2.49 ( 452)	2.76 ( 387)	2.94 ( 476)
Medium high income	2.17 ( 217)	1.52 ( 644)	1.57 ( 408)	2.07 ( 402)	2.26 ( 348)	2.86 ( 607)	3.02 ( 472)
High income	1.92 ( 361)	1.51 ( 855)	1.57 ( 526)	2.22 ( 265)	2.17 ( 461)	2.78 ( 374)	2.85 ( 575)
Eta=	.111	.084	.052	.146	.112	.124	.063

Table a.11. Mean Internal Political Political Inefficacy by  
Family Income, 1952 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1952 ----	MEAN (N) 1956 ----	MEAN (N) 1960 ----	MEAN (N) 1964 ----	MEAN (N) 1966 ----	MEAN (N) 1968 ----	MEAN (N) 1970 ----	MEAN (N) 1972 ----	MEAN (N) 1974 ----	MEAN (N) 1976 ----
Low income	2.25 ( 337)	2.12 ( 418)	1.93 ( 435)	2.12 ( 842)	2.10 ( 233)	2.12 ( 620)	2.05 ( 381)	2.12 ( 491)	2.05 ( 510)	1.68 ( 613)
Medium low income	1.99 ( 271)	1.78 ( 219)	1.67 ( 406)	1.86 ( 821)	1.95 ( 241)	1.86 ( 348)	1.87 ( 445)	1.90 ( 606)	1.84 ( 433)	1.50 ( 462)
Medium income	1.85 ( 394)	1.72 ( 271)	1.56 ( 312)	1.62 (1162)	1.66 ( 271)	1.69 ( 677)	1.62 ( 292)	1.81 ( 540)	1.73 ( 396)	1.39 ( 478)
Medium high income	1.70 ( 261)	1.45 ( 448)	1.46 ( 262)	1.59 ( 692)	1.69 ( 239)	1.36 ( 417)	1.39 ( 407)	1.55 ( 403)	1.58 ( 609)	1.41 ( 482)
High income	1.51 ( 456)	1.16 ( 325)	1.30 ( 481)	1.29 ( 927)	1.27 ( 230)	1.26 ( 536)	1.26 ( 269)	1.34 ( 556)	1.33 ( 381)	1.12 ( 585)
Eta=	.305	.357	.244	.293	.286	.304	.290	.269	.243	.177

Table A.12. Mean External Political Inefficacy by  
Family Income, 1968 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1968 ----	MEAN (N) 1970 ----	MEAN (N) 1972 ----	MEAN (N) 1974 ----	MEAN (N) 1976 ----
Low income	1.92 ( 609)	2.08 ( 374)	2.12 ( 481)	2.10 ( 503)	1.77 ( 596)
Medium low income	1.60 ( 344)	1.74 ( 441)	1.83 ( 595)	1.90 ( 420)	1.61 ( 458)
Medium income	1.34 ( 668)	1.70 ( 284)	1.72 ( 535)	1.64 ( 388)	1.47 ( 470)
Medium high income	1.17 ( 415)	1.27 ( 398)	1.68 ( 402)	1.71 ( 609)	1.51 ( 475)
High income	1.07 ( 532)	1.20 ( 265)	1.36 ( 553)	1.34 ( 379)	1.34 ( 579)
Eta=	.268	.263	.208	.210	.123

Table a.13. Mean Internal Political Political Inefficacy by  
Subjective Social Class, 1952 to 1976

	MEAN (N) 1952 -----	MEAN (N) 1956 -----	MEAN (N) 1960 -----	MEAN (N) 1964 -----	MEAN (N) 1966 -----	MEAN (N) 1968 -----	MEAN (N) 1970 -----	MEAN (N) 1972 -----	MEAN (N) 1974 -----	MEAN (N) 1976 -----
Working class	1.98 (1058)	1.86 (1052)	1.71 (1243)	1.43 (1851)	1.97 ( 719)	1.98 (1419)	1.87 ( 964)	2.01 (1434)	1.93 (1295)	1.57 (1440)
Middle class	1.62 ( 655)	1.29 ( 628)	1.33 ( 616)	1.20 ( 79)	1.43 ( 501)	1.34 (1160)	1.45 ( 845)	1.46 (1175)	1.49 (1066)	1.25 (1280)
Eta=	.205	.245	.190	.047	.274	.305	.204	.272	.223	.143



Table A.14. Mean External Political Inefficacy by  
Subjective Social Class, 1968 to 1976

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	MEAN (N) 1968 -----	MEAN (N) 1970 -----	MEAN (N) 1972 -----	MEAN (N) 1974 -----	MEAN (N) 1976 -----
Working class	1.70 (1399)	1.88 ( 949)	1.97 (1414)	2.00 (1265)	1.64 (1410)
Middle class	1.15 (1150)	1.33 ( 829)	1.46 (1165)	1.47 (1048)	1.41 (1265)
Eta=	.229	.226	.214	.225	.091

Table A.15. Mean Political Cynicism by Subjective Social Class,  
1958 to 1976

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	MEAN (N) 1958 -----	MEAN (N) 1964 -----	MEAN (N) 1968 -----	MEAN (N) 1970 -----	MEAN (N) 1972 -----	MEAN (N) 1974 -----	MEAN (N) 1976 -----
Working class	2.20 ( 974)	1.56 (1677)	1.77 (1366)	2.58 ( 935)	2.63 (1146)	3.18 (1251)	3.13 (1381)
Middle class	2.01 ( 645)	1.78 ( 73)	1.52 ( 114)	2.23 ( 822)	2.24 ( 997)	2.69 (1052)	2.88 (1249)
Eta=	.063	.029	.097	.109	.118	.160	.085

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